R ecently the CEO of a large German public bank noted that German start-ups should be financed almost exclusively with equity, since debt financing is not appropriate for bearing the huge risks that newly founded firms entail. In this paper we investigate whether young, small and medium-sized enterprises (henceforth SMEs) classified as innovative firms indeed favour equity financing, and explore the factors determining their choice of financing mode. Financial theory discusses the optimal financial structure of firms extensively. But empirical evidence on the choice of the financing mode in young high-tech SMEs is rather limited. Our paper contributes towards closing this gap.
THE DETERMINANTS OF DEBT AND (PRIVATE) EQUITY FINANCING: THE CASE OF YOUNG, INNOVATIVE SMES FROM GERMANY DOROTHEA SCHÄFER, AXEL WERWATZ AND VOLKER ZIMMERMANN R ecently the CEO of a large German public bank noted that German start-ups should be financed almost exclusively with equity, since debt financing is not appropriate for bearing the huge risks that newly founded firms entail. In this paper we investigate whether young, small and medium-sized enterprises (henceforth SMEs) classified as innovative firms indeed favour equity financing, and explore the factors determining their choice of financing mode. Financial theory discusses the optimal financial structure of firms extensively. But empirical evidence on the choice of the financing mode in young high-tech SMEs is rather limited. Our paper contributes towards closing this gap.
Much of the literature on financial contracting focuses on debt contracts, which are often assumed rather than derived as the optimal method of financing. However, as de Meza and Webb (1987) point out, some distorting phenomena like rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) may simply disappear if equity contracts are allowed. Despite the clear-cut results on the relation between the type of asymmetric information and the preferred financial instrument in de Meza and Webb (1987) , the theoretical results on financing decisions are far from conclusive. In particular, the impact of both the intrinsic and the financial risk on selecting either debt or equity financing remains an unresolved issue.
Only recently have contradictory results been derived. On the one hand Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000) show that high-risk entrepreneurs choose debt contracts whereas low-risk entrepreneurs select equity contracts. On the other hand the literature on financing start-ups predicts that high-risk projects are associated with venture capital rather than with bank financing (for example, Ueda 2004). In these models the venture capitalist has superior expertise in screening, monitoring and providing managerial support for the founder. This expertise seems to be of more value for high-risk projects. Explicit reference to equity contracts is rare. But as venture capitalists normally draw up equity or equity-like contracts, these findings imply a close tie between highly risky entrepreneurs and equity financing. Venture capitalists themselves consider it as the core of their own business model that they select highrisk, high-return ventures and contribute towards improving their prospects during the period of investment (Manigart and Sapienza 1999) .
In this paper we examine empirically whether and how the market for financing young German high-tech companies is divided between credit financiers, normally banks, and equity financiers, normally venture capitalists. We rely on a data-set that contains detailed financial and project information sampled from firms with investors refinanced by the KfW Group (henceforth KfW). 1 KfW is a government-owned support bank that manages most national programmes for promoting SMEs. The main focus of our study is to explore whether entrepreneurs pre-select financing modes according to their project's characteristics. In particular we ask:
What is the role of risk for choosing debt and equity financing? What is the relationship between the provision of informed capital, risk and the mode of financing? Finally, what lessons for start-up finance can be derived from the evidence?
Regarding the indicators of financial risk in our data, the results are clear-cut: risky enterprises with a low cash flow (price cost margin) or a low ratio of equity to total assets tend to receive equity financing. Also, equity financing is more likely the larger the size of the project. The latter result is not surprising, given that the costly screening and coaching activities of equity financiers favour larger deal sizes. Moreover, in order to control their exposure to risk, banks may ration their high-tech clients with respect to investment size.
Regarding the variables measuring the intrinsic risk of a project or an enterprise we find ambiguous results. Surprisingly, most indicators of the intrinsic project risk either fail to significantly influence the choice of financial mode or have a negative effect on the probability of being equity financed. In particular, investing in a real R&D project significantly decreases the likelihood of receiving equity finance. This result is quite robust. It also emerges if only the choice between equity investment with management or technical support and debt is analysed. On the other hand, if we measure an enterprise's intrinsic risk by whether it regularly performs R&D then a positive relation between intrinsic risk and the propensity to receive equity financing emerges.
Recent studies show that start-up finance in Europe and Canada hardly resembles the picture drawn from empirical studies in the USA (e.g. Cumming 2002b; Bascha and Walz 2001; Schwienbacher 2002) . We have the same aim as the authors of these papers in that we also attempt to filter out particularities of a market for start-up finance embedded in a financial system that is less market-based than the US system. Nonetheless, our approach is novel in many respects. First, we examine a sample that provides information about the financing practices of the two most important financial intermediaries for high-tech SMEs: banks and venture capitalists. Second, we use project-related and financing-related micro-data that are mostly drawn from the entrepreneurs' balance sheets as well as from questionnaires filled in by investors when they approach KfW for refinancing. Thus we do not rely exclusively on selfreporting by financiers. Third, our analysis is the first one to explicitly focus on the role of credit and equity financing in young non-listed high-tech firms in Germany. By concentrating on this type of firm we avoid two biases, the survivor and the ''highflyer'' bias. 2 Both biases arise naturally in studies that investigate listed firms. Fourth, our sample is unique in that it contains direct information on whether high-tech firms receive informed capital. We observe directly whether private equity financiers also support their client with managerial or technical advice. Fifth, and most importantly, by explicitly referring to the theoretical evidence on the choice between the two standard financial instruments we provide new evidence about the impact of risk on the financing decision. Knowing this impact is important. The potential of different financing modes (of different types of financiers) to contribute to young firms' development can only be estimated accurately if the role of both the financial risk and the project risk for the pre-selection of a specific method of financing is clarified.
However, there is also a drawback. Since in many cases complete information is not available on all relevant firm and project characteristics we face a trade-off between sample size and capturing the relevant risk factors. We try to resolve this problem by estimating different models but are aware of the fact that the problem of missing values forces us to be very cautious when interpreting the results.
We proceed as follows. The next section gives an overview of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature and states the hypotheses. Section 3 briefly compares the German market for financing high-tech firms with other European markets and the US market. Section 4 lays out the institutional details of the KfW refunding programmes and describes the data-set. Section 5 explains the empirical method. Section 6 derives the main results and Section 7 discusses the findings and concludes.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
Under both symmetric information and complete contracting, neither agency conflicts nor control problems arise. In such a world, only taxes leave room for an optimal choice of financing mode (Modigliani and Miller 1958) . In the absence of taxes, however, the financing decision would have no impact on the firm's value. In contrast, in the real world, asymmetric information prevails and-due to both an indefinite number of future states and unverifiable information 3 -contracts are incomplete and moral hazard occurs (Aghion and Bolton 1992) . In such an environment, even if taxes are neglected, financing decisions matter (Hart 2001) .
Ex ante, being paid back depends primarily on the investor's exposure to risk. Thus risk is a crucial determinant for the type of financial contract offered. The investor's risk exposure is a function of the intrinsic project risk, the implied financial risk and the availability of risk mitigating devices. The literature is divided about how these risk components affect the choice between debt and equity contracts. The bank versus venture capital literature predicts an equilibrium where high-risk projects are equity financed and entrepreneurs with safer projects apply for loan financing. Ueda (2004) develops a model in which the venture capitalist (henceforth VC) is informed whereas banks are at an informational disadvantage and suffer from a lack of business expertise. The VC's superior expertise enables him to detect unprofitable projects and to take over control of the project. Given these differences between the two types of financiers, the project risk and the financial risk are decisive for the choice of contracts. A lower probability of success and a higher cash flow work in favour of informed venture capital (equity) financing whereas higher amounts of collateral and lower upfront investments support debt financing. A broadly similar conclusion is reached by Landier (2002) . Note that in both models the demand side determines the choice of the financing mode since venture (equity) capital is a voluntary choice driven by higher profits gained from that source. Bolton and Freixas (2000) take a different approach. In their model the supply side determines how an entrepreneur is financed. Debt is the preferred mode for any entrepreneur. But since dilution costs are huge for high-risk entrepreneurs, they are turned down by banks and have no option but equity financing. Bolton and Freixas consider the high-risk equity segment as the ''last resort'' where venture capital firms would offer their services.
The literature on collateralization also implies supply side restrictions. Pledging collateral reduces the creditor's financial risk. For this reason, collateral is said to enable entrepreneurs to circumvent rationing in the loan segment to some extent or even completely (Bester 1985 (Bester , 1987 Besanko and Thakor 1987) . Of course, this route of returning to the preferred loan market is not open for high-risk entrepreneurs lacking collateral and equity may be the only remaining option.
Unfortunately the reason for choosing a specific mode of financing is not observable. But irrespective of whether the financing mode is driven by the demand or the supply side, the literature mentioned above leads us to Hypothesis 1: Investments with a high intrinsic and financial risk are more likely to be equity financed than debt financed. Investments with a low intrinsic and financial risk are more likely to be debt financed than equity financed. Landier (2002) and Ueda (2004) argue that informed equity is of particular importance for high-risk entrepreneurs. Although not obvious at first glance, such a conjecture also follows from the literature on moral hazard and collateral. Suppose entrepreneurs have an incentive to manipulate returns or report them falsely (Bester and Hellwig 1989; Boot et al. 1991; Bester 1994) because investors are unable to observe or verify the true cash flows. In such a scenario debt is the optimal financial instrument since it minimizes the cost of lying (Townsend 1979; Gale and Hellwig 1985) . If a high-risk entrepreneur is denied a loan and lacks collateral, investors would even be more reluctant to finance if only offered a proportional sharing rule. Then equity financing is only feasible if it is informed in the sense that it exerts a similar disciplining effect as collateral does. Only if appropriate control rights enable the investor to detect false reporting and to stop manipulation will equity financing be available to the entrepreneur. Since powerful execution of ownership and control rights can only be expected from a highly concentrated ownership, moral hazard induced equity financing is compatible with informed private equity financing but not as compatible with equity financing via public offerings. By taking these considerations into account we arrive at Hypothesis 1a: If equity is informed the relation between risk and the financial mode predicted in Hypothesis 1 is more pronounced.
Note that both conjectures coincide with conventional wisdom on the impact of risk on the nature of segmentation in the market for financing high-tech firms. Nonetheless, a second strand of literature argues differently. By generalizing the models of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987) , Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000) show that high-risk entrepreneurs choose debt in equilibrium whereas safer entrepreneurs opt for equity. A similar conjecture is derived by Boadway and Keen (2002) . The rationale behind this result is simple. A debt-financed high-risk, high-return entrepreneur who is successful owns the entire surplus above the fixed face value calculated from the bank's break-even condition for the average entrepreneur. In contrast, an equity-financed entrepreneur of that type would have to share his high cash flow with the investor. For any present value, there is a risk-return threshold that leaves the entrepreneur indifferent between debt and equity financing. Although rationing may occur in both markets in principle, entrepreneurs with success probabilities below and returns above this threshold select a debt contract. Conversely, founders with opposite risk-return characteristics receive equity financing. If this suggestion coincides with reality we should observe the opposite to Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 2: Investments with a high intrinsic and financial risk are more likely to be debt financed than equity financed. Investments with a low intrinsic and financial risk are more likely to be equity than debt financed.
To our knowledge, only three papers have analysed the determinants of debt and equity financing in high-tech SMEs to date. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) study the financial behaviour of high-tech companies in the USA prior to and after their IPO. These firms usually have low debt-to-assets ratios prior to the IPO, but increase debt after being listed. Moreover, particularly in small firms, debt is secured at nearly 100 per cent. According to Carpenter and Petersen, these findings suggest that high-tech firms particularly suffer from severe credit constraints as long as these firms represent huge risks for financiers. Only when high-tech firms gain access to the public equity market and are thus able to establish a reputation as a mature firm, are credit constraints lifted. Audretsch and Lehmann (2003) analyse the determinants of the financial structure of firms listed between 1997 and 2002 on Germany's Neuer Markt. They show that small and innovative firms are more likely to be equity (venture capital) financed. Moreover, intangible assets such as R&D investment, which consists mainly of staff costs, increase the likelihood of obtaining venture capital finance. A listed firm that has obtained venture capital experiences a higher employment growth rate than a firm that is debt financed. This latter suggestion is in stark contrast to Bottazi and Da Rin (2002) . Exploring European growth bourses including the Neuer Markt they find no significant impact of venture capital on the firms' performances. Cumming (2002a) explores whether the financing behaviour of the Canadian venture capital industry reflects adverse selection among entrepreneurial firms. To this end, he analyses the determinants of entrepreneurs' (relative) preferences for six distinct financial instruments used by the Canadian VC industry, including straight debt and common equity. Following Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000) , Cumming hypothesizes that straight debt will attract the riskier firms and common equity will attract low-risk/low-return firms. Moreover, he assumes that attraction follows the ''Lemons Principle'', which states that the worst possible types are attracted to a specific form of finance. Given this assumption he finds considerable evidence for self-selection (adverse selection) among Canadian entrepreneurial firms with respect to both standard financial instruments.
In our own empirical research, we focus exclusively on non-listed high-tech companies. We do not treat these firms as one risk class, as do Carpenter and Petersen (2002) , but instead aim to find out which theoretical prediction best fits into the empirical reality of the heavily bank-based German financial system. To this end, we construct several measures for both the intrinsic and the implied financial risk from balance sheets and structured descriptions of the planned project, and analyse their impact on the likelihood of being debt or equity financed.
FINANCING INNOVATIVE SMES IN GERMANY
While banks are a rather established source for financing SMEs in Germany, private equity financing is still in a state of development (Fischer and Zimmermann 2003) . The private equity industry is relatively young. The first German venture capital firm was only founded in 1965. Business angels are an even newer phenomenon. Experience with the complete venture cycle (funding, investing and exiting) is limited among German VCs (Bascha and Walz 2001) . Table 1 shows the domestic classic venture capital invested as a percentage of GDP. Despite the boom in the last decade, the German VC industry is still far behind the US industry, the latter normally being considered the role model for a well-developed VC industry. Compared to other European countries Germany is in a medium range. In 2000, the German figure represented the fifth highest level. In 2001, Germany's VC investment/GDP dropped to the fourth lowest level of all European countries shown in the table. Unfortunately, no comparable information about business angels or other types of private investors is available.
The exact share of outside equity finance for innovative SMEs, whether from VCs or other shareholders, is unknown. For the total of all SMEs, however, bank debt is by far the largest source of external finance. Estimates for the USA show that at most 5 per cent of SMEs' external finance comes from equity sources (Berger and Udell 2002) . For most European countries, this figure is likely to be less. On the one hand the private equity industry is not as strong and, on the other hand, in general banks play a greater role in corporate financing than US banks. For Germany in particular, relationship-based financing for SMEs is traditionally the core business of most banking institutions. Hackethal and Schmidt (1999) estimated that for the period of 1970-96 more than 80 per cent of gross external finance for German corporations came from banks. This figure was only 44 per cent for the USA.
DATA DESCRIPTION
The rate of innovative firms depends on the availability of outside finance, as most young firms do not have enough cash flow to finance their own growth opportunities.
To increase this availability, most governments have launched specific programmes that should induce intermediaries to provide financing for this type of firm. KfW manages Germany's most important national programmes in this respect. Basically, KfW runs two models when promoting innovative SMEs, the co-investment model and the refinancing model. Within the co-investment model, the public bank invests jointly with a private lead investor directly into the firm by taking on silent equity. Conversely, within the refinancing model, financial intermediaries that have invested into a high-tech firm are refunded. Since only the refunding model addresses both private equity and loan financing, our data are taken only from KfW's refunding programmes.
The KfW refunding programmes for promoting innovative firms
Within the refunding programmes, any intermediary whose application is accepted receives a loan by KfW (see Figure 1 ). These loans are meant to compensate the intermediary for the liquidity drain caused either by an equity or by a loan investment.
Intermediaries that make an equity investment have to apply for refinancing under the KfW/BMWA Technology Participation Programme (henceforth BTU) or the ERP Innovation Programme (equity variant) (henceforth ERPB). 4 The BTU programme has been running since 1995 and is geared particularly towards encouraging investments in technology-oriented start-up companies, whilst the ERPB was set up in 1999 and refinances equity investments in SMEs of any age.
Intermediaries investing via loans are refinanced under the ERP Innovation Programme (loan variant) (henceforth ERPK), which was launched in 1996. This programme is equally open to loan investments into SMEs of any age.
A major prerequisite for being eligible for receiving a refinancing loan within these programmes is that the underlying venture is innovative. This means that intermediaries can only apply if their portfolio firm uses the money to develop either a new product or technique, or to introduce a new product or new technique into the market. The portfolio firm must spend significant parts of the investment money on R&D, and must conduct an essential part of the R&D on its own. An intermediary can only receive refinancing for these parts of its investment into the portfolio firm that are directly attributable to the particular innovation project. 5 Any programme defines its own upper limit for the proportion of the intermediary's total investment (maximum funding share) that can be refinanced by the KfW.
In order to encourage investments, KfW offers favourable contractual terms. In all three programmes the accepted intermediaries receive long-term loans at favourable conditions. Moreover, KfW assumes part of the intermediaries' default risk against payment of an appropriate risk premium by the intermediary. That is, if the portfolio firm defaults, the intermediary only has to pay back part of his KfW loan. The percentage that KfW writes off depends on the programme itself and on particular features of the investment. The exemption from liability ranges from 40 per cent for innovation projects in SMEs under the ERP Innovation Programme (loans) to 100 per cent for innovation projects in technology oriented start-up companies under the BTU programme (see Appendix B). The intermediary's total release from default risk 5 The eligible refunding share includes all innovation-related investments in real and human capital. Investments in machinery or equipment are refundable, as well as ''soft investments'', such as personnel costs for R&D staff; costs of training, external advisory services, and business information acquisition. All overheads directly attributable to the innovative project are also refundable.
is determined by the exemption from liability and the maximum refunding share defined in the programmes. 6 Although considerable parts of the risk connected with the investment still remain with investors, these features of the programme make the KfW's refinancing programmes attractive to all intermediaries considering investing into a high-tech firm. This attraction leaves us confident that our sample does not consist of specific investor groups that are for some reason close to public support banks, but contains a broad range of private equity and loan investors.
We use the information sampled from firms whose financiers successfully applied for refinancing. Of course, since the degree of release from default risk varies among and within the various programmes, we have to accept the fact that the release itself may be a major determinant for the observed financing mode. While we do not incorporate the different levels of reducing the financier's risk exposure explicitly into our estimation, we note that the release from default risk in the loan programmes is usually below the release in the equity programmes up to the year 2003 (see Appendix B). Since the overwhelming majority of observations fall into the period 1999-2002, we can exclude the possibility that the nature of risk sharing creates a bias in favour of loan financing. 7 At first glance, KfW's screening procedure could be another source of systematic sample distortion. However, given that public programmes aim primarily to initiate more equity financing, it is unlikely that applications from equity financiers are more thoroughly screened than applications from lenders. Thus our sample should also not be biased in the sense that it entails only relatively safe equity investments.
The risk variables
In order to capture the investor's risk exposure, we construct several classes of risk indicators. 8 First of all, we employ age as a general risk indicator. This follows from the fact that firms in their very early phases of development do not possess a track record for management. Moreover, investors cannot rely on signals produced by the product market when assessing the future prospects of the firm. Thus at this stage, the degree of asymmetric information between investor and firm is extremely high. With increasing maturity, however, the general level of uncertainty about future prospects should ease.
The investor's financial risk depends on the size of the transaction and the degree 6 Let us assume, for example, an equity investor puts 2 million euros into a portfolio firm that wants to develop a completely new bio-tech product. Suppose that in the equity programme the share that can be refinanced is fixed at a maximum of 50 per cent, and the exemption from liability is 70 per cent. In this case, the equity investor receives a loan from KfW of 50 per cent of its own investment, that is 1 million euros. During the lifetime of the long-term loan contract, the intermediary pays interest to KfW in accordance with the conditions of the specific programme, and if the firm survives until the loan contract expires the intermediary also pays back the principal of 1 million euros to KfW. However, if the portfolio firm defaults, the intermediary has to pay back only 30 per cent of the principal, that is, 0.3 million euros. Thus the intermediary's total release from default risk for this particular investment of 2 million euros amounts to 35 per cent (i.e. 0.7 million euros (written off by KfW) divided by 2 million euros (entire investment into the portfolio firm) equals 0.35). 7 Note that the overwhelming majority of observations fall into the period before 2003. In that period, the BTU programme provided a release from default risk of 70 per cent (see also Appendix A). 8 For an overview of the explanatory variables see also Appendix C. of insurance against losses in the event of default. In some cases, a low total equity to total assets ratio and a lack of sizeable assets may not only be interpreted by potential lenders as an indicator for a low insurance of claims but also as a sign of a lack of commitment to the firm on the entrepreneur's side. Thus we suggest that entrepreneurs are more likely to be rejected by lenders if the investment is large, sizeable assets are scarce, and lenders would become almost a residual claimant to the firm. In order to capture the size effect, we employ the amount of investment relative to total assets (size-assets). In the event of default, the lender can take material assets and receivables away but human capital is not sizeable as the law prohibits slavery. We account for these distinctions by using the ratio of fixed assets plus current assets relative to staff expenses (tangible-nontangible) as proxies for the availability of collateral. Total equity to total assets reflects the degree to which a potential lender would be a residual claimant (totalEquity-assets). Finally, annual turnover minus staff costs minus cost of materials (price cost margin) is taken as an indicator for the firm's ability to service debt.
In order to capture the intrinsic risk, we begin by constructing four dummy variables for the venture's degree of novelty and the firm's ambition. On the one hand, demand is extremely uncertain for projects with a high degree of novelty and a high ambition. On the other hand, such highly innovative projects promise a greater return potential, as success would generally imply that either a monopoly position or at least a first-mover advantage is achieved. We suggest that the intrinsic risk is higher if the intermediary's money is spent on developing a new product or process (innoprocess-product) than if it is spent on introducing a product/process already developed into the market. We also conjecture that the risk is higher if the firm invests in developing a product that is entirely new (inno-and-newproduct) than if it invests in improving an already existing product. We consider an investment made to introduce a product into the market as more risky if the product is a novelty (introduct-productnew) instead of being only a new model or version of an existing product. Finally, the investment should carry more risk if the project is ambitious, that is, if the firm uses the money for developing an entirely new technological and business field (newfield) instead of using it to maintain a technological lead that has already been achieved, or to adapt to a new technological development.
In addition to novelty and ambition, we consider the R&D content as being closely related to the risk-return potential of a specific venture. First, we conjecture that a large ratio of R&D expenses to annual turnover (R&D-intensity-firm) reflects a high intrinsic risk. Second, an investment that is classified as a true R&D investment (classified R&D-project) is riskier than an investment that fails to receive that label. The loan officer at KfW classifies the specific investment as a true R&D investment if the money serves to finance the R&D phase of a new product or technology. The label is not granted if the intermediary finances the introduction of an already existing product into the market. Since only the loan department determines the nature of this variable, we consider classified R&D-project as a particularly strong indicator for the intrinsic risk of the venture. Finally, we construct a further dummy variable that reflects how regularly the firm carries out R&D. An investment should be more risky if it is made in a firm that exerts R&D on a regular basis (R&D-regular).
We explored some more indicators for the intrinsic risk such as R&D expenses to staff costs or whether or not external research units such as universities have contributed to the original project idea. However, since these indicators are badly observed and, if included into the model, they also fail to have explanatory power, we do not comment on them any further. Note that we observe most intrinsic risk variables at the project but not at the firm level. However, the project size is huge on average compared to the firm size (see summary statistics, where the variable sizeassets reflects the ratio of project size to firm size). Thus, we do not pay special attention to the distinct levels when interpreting the results.
The sample
Our sample is based on investments promoted by KfW in the period from 1999 to mid-2003. Equity financing comprises common equity, silent equity and a loan granted from a shareholder. Common equity defines a proportional sharing rule and gives the holder voting rights. In contrast, silent equity obliges the firm to fulfil a pre-specified claim regularly and carries only conditional voting rights. Only if the firm fails to service the pre-specified claim is the holder of a silent equity claim allowed to exert his voting rights. In addition to these two instruments, we take a shareholder loan as equity financing. This is justified for two reasons. First, the loan is subordinated to all other debt claims. This makes the lender a residual claimant, as is the case with equity financing. Second, the loan's interest directly reduces the return of the shareholder's claims from equity. Thus we interpret loan-related payments to the shareholder as part of his overall claim that results from shareholding. In order to deal with the problem of ''hidden'' loan collateralization via unlimited liability of the entrepreneur, we exclude investments in firms with unlimited liability. We restrict our analysis to firms with an annual turnover below 125 million euros and define an upper limit for the firm's age of 5 years. We also exclude applications in both a debt and an equity programme, as well as applications with inconsistent information. Multiple observations coming from one firm are possible, but very rare. They are left in the sample since the observations stem from different stages of the firm's life. After completing these steps, we are left with 903 observations.
As mentioned above, we suffer from a problem of missing values. This problem is particularly severe for the financial risk variables. Facing a trade-off between completeness and sample size, we decided to test several models. Our basic specification includes sets of sectoral and year dummies, age, and the complete set of financial risk indicators. Due to the missing value problem, the sample size for this basic specification is reduced to 228 observations. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the basic specification. 9 The intrinsic risk variables are added to this basic specification one at a time. Of course, as the number of observations for the specific risk variable is the limiting factor, the size and structure of the sample change with each specification. Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the intrinsic risk variable for each specification.
The percentage of equity investments in the samples is higher than 50 per cent (see Table 5 ). This sample structure implies that private equity financing is of much greater importance for Germany's young high-tech firms than for SMEs in general. Nonetheless, it is possible that the fraction of equity-financed firms is too high compared with their true share in the whole population of externally financed young high-tech firms. We take this problem into account when estimating our results.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
We study how the propensity to receive equity financing depends on explanatory variables characterizing the project and financial risk of a particular innovative SME . .) and the dummy explanatory variables (denoted as z 1 , z 2 ,. . .) on the propensity to receive equity financing we fit both the popular Logit model in its standard form and the following ''non-linear'' version:
where the continuous explanatory variables, such as the project size, enter the model as fractional polynomials (Sauerbrei and Royston 1999; Ambler and Royston 2001) . These polynomials are of the form 1 x p j ò 2 x p j log(x j ), where the second term is optional, the powers p are restricted to the set {ñ2, ñ1, ñ0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 3} and pó0 is synonymous with log(x j ). Note that these polynomials are linear in the coefficients 1 and 2 , which are estimated by standard Logit maximum likelihood algorithms, along with the coefficients 1 , 2 ,. . . of the discrete (dummy) explanatory variables z 1 , z 2 ,. . .. The powers p are determined by successively comparing models with different values of p according to their fit (deviance).
Apart from the ease with which it can be estimated and interpreted, the Logit model has a feature that makes it particularly attractive for our empirical analysis: the estimates of its slope coefficients are robust to deviations from random sampling referred to as ''choice-based-sampling'' in the econometrics literature (Anderson 1972; Scott and Wild 1986) . That is, if the sample at hand cannot be considered as a random sample from the distribution of the dependent variable Y (because, for instance, equity-financed firms have been over-sampled) then the Logit estimates of the slope coefficients (the and coefficients) can still be consistently estimated from the choice-based sample. Only the Logit estimate of the intercept coefficient will be inconsistent. 10 The fractions of equity-financed and debt-financed firms in our sample are functions of the application behaviour of the financial intermediaries and the admission rules of KfW. The fraction of, say, equity-financed firms in our sample may thus be higher than their population share because KfW may have chosen to expand its equity programmes to achieve certain policy aims. For this reason, we view our sample as possibly being choice-based-which suggests the advisability of using the Logit model for the reasons given in the previous paragraph. Table 4 presents the estimation results for the test of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Although the Logit models that allowed for non-linear effects (via fractional polynomials) fit the data significantly better than their linear counterparts, we still report the results from the latter. This is because both types of models yield qualitatively similar results but the estimates of the standard Logit model are easier to communicate. In order to make the table easily comprehensible we omit to report the coefficients of the controls. For any model, size and structure of the sample are presented. For example, the sample defined by the basic specification contains 228 investments. Loan investments account for 45 per cent and equity investments for 55 per cent of the sample. Our general risk indicator age is weakly significant in the basic specification but looses any explanatory power if an intrinsic risk indicator is included (Models 1-7) . In contrast, most indicators for a high financial risk increase the likelihood of receiving equity finance. In all specifications shown in Table 4 , the coefficient for the relative investment size is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. A high price cost margin and a high ratio of equity to assets decrease the likelihood (increase the likelihood) of equity finance (debt finance). The significance levels of these indicators are also quite robust across specifications. Hence, the results for most of the financial risk variables confirm Hypothesis 1. Only the ratio of tangible to non-tangible assets, which is an indicator for the availability of inside collateral, fails to have explanatory power.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
However, this latter result may be due to the fact that our sample includes private and state-owned venture capital firms. The latter type of equity investor is normally less profit-oriented and is said to often behave more like a bank than venture capital firms. In order to test the effect of state-owned venture capital firms on the overall results, we excluded their investments from the sample in a further specification not reported here. Then the variable tangible-nontangible gained statistical significance and the coefficient was negative.
The results for the intrinsic risk are less straightforward. Regular R&D activities in a firm (instead of R&D activities occasionally) increase the likelihood of equity finance but the results with respect to novelty and ambition are contrary to Hypothesis 1. Developing a new product or technique (inno-process-product) induces a lower probability of receiving equity than introducing an already existing product or technique into the market. The same is true if the firm wants to invest in developing an entirely new product (inno-and-newproduct) instead of investing in improving an already existing product. The most surprising result with regard to the subgroup of R&D variables is the significantly negative impact of the variable classified R&Dproject. 11 Hence, conducting a true R&D project significantly lowers the odds of receiving equity financing. 12 Since many records in our data have missing values for one or several key explanatory variables we loose many observations when estimating larger multivariate models such as those shown in Table 4 . In particular, very young firms are eliminated from the estimation samples because they have missing entries especially for the variables describing the financial risk of a project or an enterprise. We try to address and alleviate this problem by additionally estimating specifications in which we reduce the number of explanatory variables (besides the time and sectoral dummies) to only four: age, annual turnover, size-asset and one intrinsic risk indicator at a time. Moreover, we assume that-if not reported-annual turnover is zero. The results for these alternative specifications are reported in Appendix A. It turns out that sign and significance of the estimated coefficients are quite robust to specification changes and usually agree with the corresponding estimates of the ''more variables/fewer observations'' models reported in Table 4 . We take this robustness as a hint that our results are not mainly driven by the specific composition of the sample that results from a particular specification. Table 5 gives the results for the test of Hypothesis 1a. Note that only equity engagements combined with managerial or technical support and loans are taken into account for testing the informed capital hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a). Thus, the estimation samples are subsets of those shown in Table 4 . For reasons of space, we omit the summary statistic for these specifications. Obviously, focusing on informed equity has hardly any specific impact on our estimates.
Again the relative project size and price cost margin are highly significant and show the expected sign. Moreover, having a high R&D content (classified R&D-project) reduces the project's likelihood of being financed with equity, and regular R&D activities in a firm increase this likelihood. Hence, the estimated impact of risk on the likelihood of equity finance leads to similar results if only informed equity is taken into account. That is, we cannot find evidence in favour of Hypothesis 1a.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The private equity industry is often considered as a solution to the financing problems of high-risk entrepreneurs. Little is known, however, about whether this common wisdom is true to the reality of high-tech financing in heavily bank-based financial systems such as the German system. Are more risky high-tech firms indeed more likely to receive equity than debt financing?
This study explores the relation, so far neglected, between the degree of risk embedded in high-tech projects and the means of financing these projects. We find that the indicators describing the financial risk of a project or an enterprise are important predictors for the choice of the financing mode: as expected, (financially) risky projects tend to receive equity financing. In particular, firms with a low price cost margin and a low ratio of equity to assets (prior to the financing stage observed and analysed in this paper) possess a significantly higher chance of receiving equity finance. The same is true for firms with a large project size-a particularly powerful predictor for whether the project is equity financed. This is most likely due to the considerable cost associated with the screening and coaching activities of many equity financiers that may be justified and recouped only for large deals. Whether this is also a sign that banks implicitly restrict their financial risk by limiting the amount of loan granted to the high-tech firm (rationing with respect to the project size) or whether this result simply reflects the fact that banks-contrary to conventional wisdomstage their financing more than private equity financiers (and grant further credits in the course of the venture's development process) remains to be investigated using (presently unavailable) information on follow-on finance.
Regarding the measures of the intrinsic risk of a project or an enterprise our results are less conclusive. On one hand, if regular R&D activities are taken as an indicator for a risky enterprise, then high intrinsic risk tends to increase the propensity to receive equity financing. On the other hand, our qualitative indicators of the degree of novelty or ambition (and therefore the riskiness) of a project often have no significant impact or even a significantly negative impact on the tendency of a project to be financed by private equity. Several explanations for these rather surprising results are possible. First, our qualitative indicators may simply fail to properly measure the intrinsic risk associated with a particular project. If they, however, do pick up the intrinsic risk effects then this result may reflect the prevalence of a more conservative business model in the German private equity industry than common wisdom suggests. VCs and other sources of private equity may focus less intensively on the highly risky stages in the process of developing a new product or process, and instead select ventures that have already succeeded in completing these steps. 13 At the same time, German banks, who traditionally play a large role in financing more conventional SMEs, may also engage in financing high-tech industries and be willing to take on the associated high intrinsic risks-albeit on a small (project) scale.
Although our data stem from public promotional programmes, we are confident that the specific conditions of these programmes do not influence our results in a systematic way. Since some of our findings are contrary to common wisdom, they are an urgent call for more empirical research into the mechanism of financing high-tech firms. More research is needed to identify differences in attitudes towards risk within the broad categories of debt and equity financiers and to explore the consequences of a specific financing mode (specific type of intermediary) for the firm's performance. In addition, given that in many European countries the private equity industry is in a similar stage of development as in Germany, it would be interesting to know whether comparable results would emerge in these countries. 
